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Abstract
We provide a theory of random intertemporal choice. Agents exhibit stochastic choice
over consumption due to preference shocks to discounting attitudes. We ﬁrst demonstrate
how the distribution of these preference shocks can be uniquely identiﬁed from random
choice data. We then provide axiomatic characterizations of some common random dis-
counting models, including exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In particular,
we show how testing for exponential discounting under stochastic choice involves checking
for both a stochastic version of stationarity and a novel axiom characterizing decreasing
impatience.
1 Introduction
In many economic situations, it is useful to model intertemporal choices, i.e. decisions
involving tradeoﬀs between earlier or later consumption, as stochastic or random. For
instance, in typical models of random utility used in discrete choice estimation, this ran-
domness is driven by unobserved heterogeneity where the econometrician is not privy to all
∗We want to thank David Ahn, Jose Apesteguia, Miguel Ballester, Yoram Halevy, Yoichiro Higashi, Vijay
Krishna, Tomasz Strzalecki, Charlie Sprenger and participants at D-Day at Duke, LA Theory Bash, UCSD,
Barcelona GSE Stochastic Choice Workshop, D-TEA and the 16th SAET Conference at IMPA for their helpful
comments.
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the various determinants of discounting attitudes.1 Even when considering the behavior
of a single individual, intertemporal choices can still be stochastic.2 Decisions involving
tradeoﬀs at diﬀerent points in time are heavily inﬂuenced by visceral factors which are
often of an uncertain nature even from the perspective of the decision-maker.3
In addition to being descriptively more accurate, a model of random intertemporal
choice would also be useful for welfare analysis. An agent whose discounting is random
but his utility is deterministic may behave as if his discounting is deterministic but his
utility is random.
However, the welfare analysis of an agent whose discounting is random would naturally
be diﬀerent from that of an agent with deterministic discounting. Given all these issues,
any careful analysis and interpretation of behavioral patterns in intertemporal choice would
require a probabilistic, or random model of discounting.
In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to study random intertemporal
choice. We model random discounting as a distribution of preference shocks to discounting
attitudes. Importantly, we focus on random discounting as the sole source of stochastic
choice. This allows us to precisely characterize the relationship between random discount-
ing and stochastic choice data.4 In applications such as demand estimation where the
relevant variable of economic interest is probabilistic choice, this is a useful and important
exercise. Moreover, since random discounting is modeled as preference shocks on discount-
ing attitudes, our theory yields robust comparative statics as demonstrated in recent work
by Apesteguia and Ballester (2018).
Our model is ﬂexible enough to allow for random discounting to be interpreted in two
ways. In the ﬁrst interpretation, we consider stochastic choice as the aggregated choice
frequencies made by agents in a group. Aggregated choices are random due to unobserved
heterogeneity in the population from the perspective of an outside observer such as an
econometrician. This is the case in most applications of discrete choice estimation or in
typical intertemporal choice experiments.
1For further discussions on random utility and discrete choice estimation, see McFadden (2001) and Train
(2009).
2For some recent evidence, see Short Experiments 2 of Agranov and Ortoleva (2017).
3Frederick et al. (2002) provides a detailed discussion on such visceral inﬂuences on intertemporal choice.
4In Section 6, we generalize our model to allow for taste shocks as well.
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In the second interpretation, we consider stochastic choice as probabilistic choice from
a single agent due to individual shocks to discounting attitudes. For instance, the agent
is asked to choose from a menu of consumption streams repeatedly over a short interval
of time. Under this interpretation, we can obtain stochastic data from experiments such
as in Tversky (1969), Camerer (1989), Ballinger and Wilcox (1997), and more recently
Regenwetter et al. (2011) and Agranov and Ortoleva (2017).5 In this case, ﬁnal payoﬀs
are randomized across the agent’s choices, so the agent considers each choice problem
independently of the others.6 Random choice is then obtained from the frequency of the
agent’s repeated choices.
In both interpretations, we interpret stochastic choice as arising from ex-ante choices
with commitment. By ex-ante, we mean that we observe choices before any consumption
is realized. Indeed, this is the case in the experiments mentioned above. For example,
in Agranov and Ortoleva (2017), each subject is presented with the same choice problem
repeatedly and his choices are elicited before any payment.7
Our main contributions are twofold. First, we show that the distribution of random
discounting can be uniquely identiﬁed from random choice. In other words, an outside
observer such as an econometrician can recover the entire distribution of discount attitudes
given suﬃcient stochastic choice data. Second, we provide axiomatic characterizations of
our model including random exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting as special cases.
As a result, we extend the characterizations of classic models of intertemporal choice to
the domain of random choice with novel implications.
In particular, our characterization of random exponential discounting sheds new light
on one of the benchmark properties of rational choice, stationarity. Originally proposed by
Koopmans (1960), the classic stationarity axiom states that choices are not aﬀected when
all consumptions are delayed by the same amount of time and it is a deﬁning property of
5See the introduction of Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) for more experiments on stochastic data.
6Assuming the agent is an expected utility maximizer, this payment procedure means that he considers each
choice problem separately.
7On the other hand, by ex-post, we mean that we observe choices only after all consumptions are realized.
It may be diﬃcult to take this ex-post interpretation literally as consumption steams in our paper have inﬁnite
length. However, with a slight modiﬁcation of our axioms for ﬁnite-period consumption streams, we can interpret
our model as ex-post as well. We consider inﬁnite streams as it is a standard domain in the literature of
intertemporal choice and allows for easy axiomatic comparisons.
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exponential discounting. We propose a stochastic version of the stationarity axiom which
we call Stochastic Stationarity. It states that choice probabilities are not aﬀected when all
consumptions are delayed by the same amount of time.
Under stochastic choice, the relationship between Stochastic Stationarity and expo-
nential discounting is weaker; one can ﬁnd a random choice model that satisﬁes Stochastic
Stationarity and all the standard properties but is not exponential discounting.8 In fact,
testing for random exponential discounting involves checking not only for Stochastic Sta-
tionarity but a new axiom which we call Decreasing Impatience. By itself, Decreasing
Impatience exactly characterizes decreasing discount ratios.9 Testing for quasi-hyperbolic
discounting involves checking for a weaker version of Stochastic Stationarity and Decreas-
ing Impatience. All these relationships are novel and unique to random intertemporal
choice.
In general, our main model is a random utility maximization model with discounted
utilities. A discount function D is a decreasing function over time that has value 1 initially
and satisﬁes the tail condition
∑
s>tD (s) → 0 as t → ∞. Random choice is characterized
by a distribution μ on the set D of discount functions and a ﬁxed taste utility u. More
precisely, the probability that an inﬁnite-period consumption stream f = (f(0), f(1), . . . )
is chosen from a menu F of consumptions streams is the probability that f is ranked higher
than every other consumption streams in F . In other words, if we let ρF (f) denote this
probability, then
ρF (f) = μ
{
D ∈ D
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t
D (t)u (f (t)) ≥
∑
t
D (t)u (g (t)) for all g ∈ F
}
.
We call this a random discounting model. One could interpret each realization of a discount
function as corresponding to a particular agent in a population (as in most applied models
of random utility) or to a particular realization of a preference shock to discounting for an
individual.
Theorem 1 shows that under a random discounting model, the distribution of discount-
8See Proposition 2 for an explicit example.
9If we let D(t) denote the discount factor at time t, then the discount ratio at t is given by D(t)/D(t+ 1).
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ing functions can be uniquely identiﬁed from random choice. Moreover, this identiﬁcation
can be achieved using only binary choice data. This extends related uniqueness results of
random utility representations to our setup with inﬁnite-period consumption streams.
Theorem 2 provides an axiomatic characterization of our main model. We introduce
three new axioms: Initial Determinism, Time Monotonicity, and Impatience. Initial De-
terminism requires choice to be deterministic when all consumption streams diﬀer only at
time 0. Time Monotonicity requires consumption streams that dominate at every time
period to be chosen for sure. Impatience requires that when a menu consists of early
and delayed consumption streams, the early streams are chosen for sure. We show that
these three axioms along with the standard axioms for random utility representations fully
characterize the random discounting model.
We then focus on the most popular model of intertemporal choice, exponential dis-
counting. In random exponential discounting, for each discount function D in the support
of μ, there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
D(t) = δt.
Theorem 3 shows that by adding two new axioms, Stochastic Stationarity and Decreasing
Impatience, we can characterize random exponential discounting.
While Stochastic Stationarity is the random analog of Koopman’s stationarity axiom,
Decreasing Impatience is new and requires that when faced with a consumption stream and
two appropriately delayed streams, either the earliest or the latest stream will be chosen
for sure. Given a model of random discounting, it is equivalent to decreasing discount
ratios, i.e. D(t)/D(t+1) ≥ D(t+1)/D(t+2) for all t almost surely. This characterization
is of interest as similar deterministic versions have been studied by several papers in the
literature, e.g. Halevy (2008), Saito (2011), Chakraborty and Halevy (2017) and Saito
(2017).10 While the classic stationarity axiom along with the standard axioms is suﬃcient
for exponential discounting under deterministic choice, the role of Decreasing Impatience
in characterizing random exponential discounting is a novel feature unique to random
10Those papers study a slightly stronger property where D(t)/D(t+ 1) > D(t+ 1)/D(t+ 2) for all t, which
they call Diminishing Impatience.
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choice.
Theorem 4 shows that by weakening Stochastic Stationarity, we obtain a model of
random quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In random quasi-hyperbolic discounting, for each D
in the support of μ, there exist β ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
D(t) = βδt.
Weak Stochastic Stationarity requires Stochastic Stationarity to hold only when compar-
ing consumption streams that have been delayed by at least one period. Analogous to
the deterministic quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, random quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing allows for violations of Stochastic Stationarity when comparing immediate to future
consumptions.
Proposition 3 provides comparative statics for our model of random discounting. It
provides a behavioral characterization of when the distribution of discount ratios under
one model of random discounting ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that of another. As
in the identiﬁcation results, such comparisons can be made based on binary choices data
only.
Finally, we consider two extensions of our model. In the ﬁrst extension, we generalize
our model by also allowing for unobserved shocks to the utility function. We show that
the joint distribution of discounting and utility shocks can be uniquely identiﬁed from
stochastic choice data. For instance, if we interpret random choice as reﬂecting repeated
choices of an individual, then we can detect when two agents exhibit the same randomness
in discounting attitudes but one agent’s utility is more random than that of the other.
This provides a measurement that captures the volatility of utility shocks independent of
discounting attitudes.
In the second extension, we address the issue of dynamic inconsistency. In our main
model, we assume that all choices are collected in a small interval of time. Since tests of dy-
namic inconsistency in the literature typically involve comparing choices from two periods
far apart in time, the static nature of our baseline model does not lend itself to addressing
the issue of dynamic inconsistency. In Section 6.2, we consider a richer primitive consisting
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of dynamic random choice data: {ρt}t∈T , where ρt is the random choice collected at time
period t. Using this richer data, we can then address the issue of dynamic inconsistency.
In particular, we axiomatize a dynamic model of random exponential discounting. This
model is characterized by the addition of one new axiom, Stochastic Dynamic Consis-
tency, which says that the random choices are the same over time (i.e. ρt = ρs for all s
and t). When we study ρt with some given period t, we consider only consumption streams
starting after period t. Hence, we interpret ρt as ex-ante choices at period t.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst discuss the related literature
below. Section 2 then introduces our model and provides the main identiﬁcation result.
Section 3 discusses the axioms for our random general discounting representation. Section
4 provides the characterization results for the special cases of random exponential and
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Section 5 discusses comparative statics and ﬁnally, Section
6 considers the two extensions.
1.1 Related Literature
There are many recent papers that study the choice-theoretic foundations of random utility.
On the theoretical side, the closest papers to ours are Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Lu
(2016). While they do not study intertemporal choice, we provide a generalization of their
results in a larger domain of choice. This extension is necessary in order for us to deal
with stochastic choice over the standard domain for intertemporal preferences, i.e., the
set of inﬁnite-period consumption streams. Furthermore, our axiomatic characterizations
for the random exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models are new and address
issues unique to intertemporal choice.
Using a diﬀerent primitive, Higashi et al. (2009) also provide a model of random dis-
counting which includes random exponential discounting as a special case. In their model,
choice data consists of a preference relation over menus reﬂecting an agent’s anticipation
of future uncertainty in discount rates. In contrast, our primitive consists of random
choice. More recently, Higashi et al. (2016) propose a behavioral deﬁnition of comparative
impatience using their model.
Pennesi (2015) studies an intertemporal version of the famous Luce model of stochastic
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choice. As in Luce’s model, the probability that an agent chooses a consumption stream
is its weighed average utility in the menu of consumption streams. In his baseline model,
each utility is evaluated according to exponential discounting but he also provides a gen-
eralization which accounts for quasi-hyperbolic discounting as well.
More recently, Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) analyze the robustness of certain ran-
dom utility models of intertemporal and risky choice. They show the possibility of a
fundamental problem in comparative statics that arises in the standard application of ran-
dom utility models. As mentioned before, since our random discounting model belongs to
the class of what they call random parameter models, we are free of their criticisms.11 In
a more recent paper, Apesteguia et al. (2017) study a case of random parameter models
where the parameters can be ordered according to the single-crossing property.
2 Model
2.1 Primitives and Notation
We consider agents choosing an inﬁnite-period stream of risky payoﬀs, i.e. lotteries. Let
time be denoted by T := {0, 1, 2, . . . }, that is, the set of all nonnegative integers. Let
X be some ﬁnite set of payoﬀs. We model consumption at each time period as a risky
payoﬀ, that is a lottery in ΔX. Thus, a consumption stream corresponds to a sequence of
lotteries in the space (ΔX)T . We let H denote the set of all possible consumption streams
endowed with the product topology.12 For any p ∈ ΔX, we sometimes abuse notation and
also let p denote the constant consumption stream that yields p in every period.
The use of risky payoﬀs to model consumption allows for a straightforward charac-
terization of our model but in general, any mixture space would work as well. For any
p, q ∈ ΔX and a ∈ [0, 1], we let ap + (1 − a)q denote the lottery (i.e. an element of
ΔX) that yields x ∈ X with probability ap(x) + (1 − a)q(x). Each consumption stream
11For further details, see our comparative statics results in Section 5.
12The product topology corresponds to point-wise convergence in that fk → f if fk (t) → f (t) for all t ∈ T .
The corresponding metric can be deﬁned as d(f, g) :=
∑
t
1
2t
‖f(t)−g(t)‖
1+‖f(t)−g(t)‖ , where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidian norm in
ΔX. On a technical note, we could have alternatively used uniform convergence but this would have resulted
in a continuity axiom that would be too weak. Of course, if T is ﬁnite, then both notions of convergence agree.
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f ∈ H yields a lottery f(t) at every time period t. For any f, g ∈ H and a ∈ [0, 1], we
let af + (1 − a)g denote the consumption stream (i.e. an element of H) that yields the
lottery af(t) + (1− a)g(t) at every period t ∈ T .13
Agents choose a stream from a menu, that is, a ﬁnite set of consumption streams. Let
K be the set of all menus of consumption streams endowed with the Hausdorﬀ metric.
Given any menu F ∈ K, we let extF denote the extreme points of F .
Choice data in our model is a random choice rule (RCR) that speciﬁes a choice dis-
tribution over consumption streams for every menu F ∈ K. Let ΔH be the set of all
measures over consumption streams and endow it with the topology of weak convergence.
Formally, a RCR is a function ρ : K → ΔH such that ρF (F ) = 1. We use the notation
ρF (f) to denote the probability that consumption stream f will be chosen in the menu
F . For binary menus F = {f, g}, we use the condensed notation ρ (f, g) to denote ρF (f).
Following Lu (2016), we model indiﬀerences by relaxing the restriction that all choice
probabilities have to be fully speciﬁed. This is analogous to how under classic deterministic
choice, if the agent is indiﬀerent between two streams, then the model is silent about which
stream the agent will choose. This allows the modeler to be agnostic about data that is
orthogonal to the parameters of interest. For example, if two consumption streams are tied,
then the stochastic choice does not specify individual choice probabilities for either stream.
We model this as non-measurability and let ρ denote the corresponding outer measure
without loss of generality.14 With this interpretation, we have ρ (f, g) = ρ (g, f) = 1
whenever two streams f and g are tied. Deﬁne K0 ⊂ K as the subset of menus that
contain no indiﬀerences.
As mentioned in the introduction, we interpret the RCR ρ as corresponding to ex-ante
choices that are observable in experiments for example. However, ρF must be deﬁned for
all menus F . We admit that it would be diﬃcult to observe choices for all menus, although
13While in our primitive, consumption lotteries are independent across time, our results would still hold if we
adopted a primitive that allowed for temporal correlations of lotteries and assumed that agents are indiﬀerent
to randomization. We could accommodate preference for randomization by adopting a more general model such
as a random intertemporal version of Saito (2015).
14Formally, stochastic choice naturally includes a σ-algebra H on H. Given any menu F , the corresponding
choice distribution ρF is a measure on the σ-algebra generated by H ∪ {F}. Without loss of generality, we let
ρ denote the outer measure with respect to this σ-algebra. See Lu (2016) for details.
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the richness of the domain allows for unique identiﬁcation (see Theorems 1 and 6) and has
been assumed in the recent literature on random choice.
2.2 Random Discounting Representations
We now describe our main model. Agents evaluate consumption streams using discounted
utilities. Discounting attitudes are modeled using a discount function D : T → [0, 1] that
is decreasing and satisﬁes D(0) = 1 and the tail convergence condition
∑
s>tD (s) → 0 as
t → ∞. The tail condition ensures that consumption at time inﬁnity is irrelevant. Let D
be the set of all discount functions. We are now ready to formally deﬁne our main model.
Deﬁnition. ρ is said to have a Random Discounting Representation if there exists a
probability measure μ on D and a vN-M function u on ΔX such that for all F ∈ K and
f ∈ F
ρF (f) = μ
{
D ∈ D
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t∈T
D (t)u (f (t)) ≥
∑
t∈T
D (t)u (g (t)) for all g ∈ F
}
.
A Random Discounting Representation is a random utility model where the utilities are
discounted utilities. Here, choice is stochastic due to preference shocks that hit discount
functions directly. The probability that one stream is chosen over another is exactly the
probability that one stream has a higher discounted utility than another. Note that for
simplicity, our model assumes that the vN-M utility u is deterministic. In other words, the
only source of stochastic choice in this model is random discounting. In Section 6.1, we
consider a generalization where the utility u is random as well, in which case, we obtain a
model that is characterized by a joint distribution over both discount functions and vN-M
utilities.
As in standard applications of random utility, one could interpret the RCR as reﬂecting
the proportion of agents in a population who choose one stream over another. Here,
random choice is motivated by unobserved heterogeneity on the part of the econometrician.
Note that the model does not impose that each agent in the population must have the
same discount function across all menus. It even allows for random discounting at the
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individual level provided that discount functions are drawn from the same distribution
μ.15
Alternatively, one could use our model to describe the random choice of a single agent
choosing from the same set of consumption streams. For example, this is the case in typical
random choice experiments where the agent is required to make repetitive choices from
the same choice set and one of his choices is randomly selected for payment at the end
of the experiment. Note that this payment procedure does not aﬀect the agent’s choice if
the agent is an expected utility maximizer, which is the case in our model. In this case,
the richness of our model can even accommodate learning by the agent. For example,
suppose D (t) = E [δ (1) · · · δ (t) |δ (1) ] where δ (t) is a discount factor for the consumption
at time t ∈ T . Notice that at the initial period, only a realization of δ(1) is known to the
agent and the discounting for period t consumption is the product δ(1)δ(2) · · · δ(t) of all
the discount factors up to t. Since the agent does not know δ(2), . . . , δ(t), he considers
the conditional expectation of the product given the realization of δ(1). This describes an
agent who updates his belief about future discount factors based on the realization of his
current discount factor.
We call the probability measure μ a discount distribution. Two natural special cases of
the representation are the following.
Deﬁnition. A discount distribution μ is
(1) exponential if and only if μ-a.s. for each t ∈ T
D(t) = δt
for some δ ∈ (0, 1).
(2) quasi-hyperbolic if and only if μ-a.s. for each t > 0
D(t) = βδt
15There is some experimental evidence in support of this. In a large ﬁeld experiment conducted over two
years, Meier and Sprenger (2015) elicited time preferences using incentivized choice experiments. Despite
changes in discounting at the individual level, they found that the aggregate distributions of discount factors
to be unchanged over the two years.
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for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1].
We say that a discount distribution is regular if the random utilities of two consumption
streams are either always or never equal. In other words, ties either never occur or occur
almost surely.16 Regular discount distributions are dense in the set of all discount distri-
butions. For example, if μ is quasi-hyperbolic where the distribution on (β, δ) ∈ [0, 1]2
is diﬀuse, then μ is regular.17 They are a relaxation of the standard restriction in tra-
ditional random utility models where utilities are never equal and allows us to allow for
indiﬀerences. Going forward, we only consider regular discount distributions in Random
Discounting Representations.
If ρ has a Random Discounting Representation, we say that it is represented by some
(μ, u) where μ is regular. Our ﬁrst result below shows that the discount distribution can
be uniquely identiﬁed by only looking at binary choices over consumption streams.
Theorem 1. Let ρ and τ be represented by (μ, u) and (ν, v) respectively. Then the following
are equivalent.
(1) ρ (f, g) = τ (f, g) for all f, g ∈ H
(2) ρ = τ
(3) (ν, v) = (μ, αu+ β) for some α > 0 and β ∈ R.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Here, we provide a brief sketch of the proof for why binary choices are suﬃcient for
identiﬁcation. By condition (1) on binary choices, for any ﬁnite subset J of T , we can pin
down the distributions of
∑
t∈J D(t)z(t) for any z ∈ RJ . By the Cramer-Wold Theorem,
this implies that the two distributions ν and μ must have the same marginal distribution on
(D(t))t∈J . Since this is true for any ﬁnite J ⊂ T , it follows from Kolmogorov’s Extension
theorem that μ = ν.
16Formally, this means that for all z ∈ [0, 1]T , D · z = 0 occurs with μ-measure zero or one.
17On the other hand, if the distribution of (β, δ) has multiple mass points, then it may not be regular.
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3 Characterizing Random Discounting
We now provide an axiomatic characterization of our general discounting model. The ﬁrst
ﬁve axioms are known in the literature for their role in characterizing random expected
utility. We will present them with limited discussion and focus on the new axioms that
are novel for our model of random intertemporal choice.
The ﬁrst axiom, Monotonicity, is a standard condition necessary for any random utility
model. It states that the probability that a stream is chosen from a menu does not increase
if we enlarge the menu.
Axiom (Monotonicity). For any F,G ∈ K, if G ⊂ F , then ρG (f) ≥ ρF (f).
The next two axioms are direct consequences of the fact that the utilities in our random
utility model are linear in consumption streams. Linearity is the random choice analog of
the standard independence axiom.
Axiom (Linearity). For any F ∈ K, g ∈ H, and a ∈ (0, 1),
ρF (f) = ρaF+(1−a)g (af + (1− a) g) .
The next axiom, Extremeness, is from Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and states that an
agent can restrict himself to extreme options of a menu without loss of generality. This
follows from the fact that the utilities in our model are linear. For instance, given two
consumption streams and a third that is an interior mixture of the two, an agent will
either choose the ﬁrst or the second but never the third.
Axiom (Extremeness). For any F ∈ K, ρF (extF ) = 1.
The following Continuity axiom is standard given the topologies we deﬁned previously.
Recall that K0 is the set of menus without indiﬀerences.
Axiom (Continuity). ρ : K0 → ΔH is continuous.
Finally, to avoid degenerate cases, we assume the following nondegeneracy axiom.
This rules out the case where all consumption streams are tied and the agent is indiﬀerent
between all consumption streams.
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Axiom (Nondegeneracy). ρF (f) < 1 for some F and some f ∈ F .
We now introduce three new axioms that are unique to random discounting. In our
model, the utility u over consumption is ﬁxed while discounting can be random. If the
consumption streams are diﬀerent only at period 0, then the choices over such consumption
streams must be deterministic. This requirement is formalized by the following axiom.
Axiom (Initial Determinism). For any F ∈ K and any f, g ∈ F , if f(t) = g(t) for all
t > 0, then ρF (·) ∈ {0, 1}.
We now introduce some useful notation. Given any two consumption streams f and g
and time period t ∈ T , deﬁne the spliced consumption stream ftg such that
ftg (s) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
f (s) if s < t,
g (s− t) if s ≥ t.
Thus, ftg is the consumption stream that is f up to period t − 1 and then restarts with
g from t onwards. In other words,
ftg = (f (0) , f (1) , . . . , f (t− 1) , g (0) , g (1) , . . . ) .
For any menu F ∈ K and any stream g ∈ H we can also deﬁne the spliced menu
Ftg := {ftg ∈ H | f ∈ F}
Note that the sequence of menus (Ftg)t∈T converges to the menu F as t → ∞ un-
der the product topology. By the Continuity axiom, ρFtg → ρF . In other words, only
consumptions in ﬁnite time matter.
Given Initial Determinism and the fact that the set of ﬁnal payoﬀs is ﬁnite, we can pin
down preferences using time 0 choice data and ﬁnd a worst consumption stream w ∈ H
where w is a constant consumption stream and for all f, g ∈ F ,
ρ (f1g, w1g) = 1.
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Lemma 2 in the Appendix shows that given the standard axioms, the worst consumption
stream is well-deﬁned.
For any menu F ∈ K and time period t ∈ T , let F (t) denote the menu of constant
consumption streams that yield f(t) at each period for all f ∈ F . Formally, F (t) = {f(t) ∈
H | f ∈ F}. We can now deﬁne our next axiom.
Axiom (Time Monotonicity). For all F ∈ K and f ∈ F , if ρF (t)1w (f (t) 1w) = 1 for all
t ∈ T , then ρF (f) = 1.
Time Monotonicity says that if the consumption at every time period of a stream is
the best in a menu, then that stream must be chosen for sure. For example, suppose F =
{f, g} only consists of two consumption streams. Thus, at every period t ∈ T , F (t)1w =
{(f(t), w, w, . . . ), (g(t), w, w, . . . )}. If (f(t), w, w, . . . ) is chosen over (g(t), w, w, . . . ) for
every t for sure, then f must be chosen over g for sure. It is the natural temporal analog
of standard monotonicity axioms. Note that given the random expected utility axioms
of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006), we can in fact replace the worst outcome w in Time
Monotonicity with any other ﬁxed consumption and our result would still hold.
Finally, we deﬁne delayed consumptions. For any f ∈ H and t ∈ T , let f t := wtf .
Hence, f t is a consumption stream that consists of f delayed by t and with w at the
beginning. In other words,
f t = (w, . . . , w︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
, f(0), f(1), f(2), . . . ).
For example, f0 = f and f1 = (w, f(0), f(1), . . . ). Impatience below states that earlier
streams are always chosen over delayed ones.
Axiom (Impatience). For any f ∈ H and t ∈ T , ρ (f, f t) = 1.
We are now ready to state our general representation theorem.
Theorem 2. ρ has a Random Discounting Representation if and only if it satisﬁes Mono-
tonicity, Linearity, Extremeness, Continuity, Nondegeneracy, Initial Determinism, Time
Monotonicity and Impatience.
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The proof of Theorem 2 consists of two main steps. First, we use the standard argu-
ments to obtain a representation for menus that consist of streams that yield non-worst
consumptions only in a ﬁnite number of time periods. The second step consists of using
Kolmogorov’s Extension theorem along with our Continuity to obtain the representation
for all menus.
4 Random Exponential and Quasi-Hyperbolic
Discounting
In this section, we focus on two of the most popular models of discounting, exponential
and quasi-hyperbolic. First, we introduce the stochastic version of the classic stationarity
axiom. For any F ∈ K and t ∈ T , let F t =: {f t | f ∈ F} denote the delayed menu where
all streams are delayed by t time periods.
Axiom (Stochastic Stationarity). For any f ∈ H and t ∈ T ,
ρF (f) = ρF t
(
f t
)
.
This is the stochastic version of the deterministic stationarity axiom as proposed by
Koopmans (1960). It is weaker than deterministic stationary in the sense that if choices
are deterministic and satisfy Koopmans’ stationary, then they must satisfy Stochastic Sta-
tionarity. The converse, however, is not true. In fact, there is some empirical evidence that
shows how Stochastic Stationarity can be satisﬁed in aggregated data despite Koopmans’
stationarity being frequently violated at the individual level. In a large ﬁeld experiment
conducted over two years, Meier and Sprenger (2015) elicited time preferences using in-
centivized choice experiments. They found that the aggregate distributions of discount
factors and the proportion of present-biased individuals are found to be unchanged over
the two years, implying that Stochastic Stationarity is satisﬁed in their data set.
In order to characterize random exponential discounting, Stochastic Stationarity is
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insuﬃcient (see example below). First, deﬁne a forward consumption f−1 by
(
f−1
)1
= f .
Note that f−1 is well deﬁned if and only if f(0) = w.
Axiom (Decreasing Impatience). For all f, g, h ∈ H, if f = ag−1 + (1− a)w and g =
ah−1 + (1− a)w, then
ρ{f,g,h} ({f, h}) = 1.
To understand Decreasing Impatience, note that there are two aspects to intertemporal
choices: the level of consumption and the timing of consumption. The condition g =
ah−1 + (1− a)w (or f = ag−1 + (1− a)w) imply that there is a trade-oﬀ between these
two aspects when an agent is choosing between g and h (or f and g). By choosing g over
h (or f over g), the agent consumes earlier but at a lower level of consumption due to
the mixing with the worst outcome. Thus, f is the earliest, lowest consumption, h is the
latest, highest consumption while g is something in between. If an agent is just impatient
enough so that he weakly prefers f to g, then a lower level of impatience one time period
later would imply that he weakly prefers h to g. In a menu consists of all three streams,
Decreasing Impatience says that he will never choose g (baring ties).18
The following result shows that Decreasing Impatience characterizes decreasing dis-
count ratios over time.
Proposition 1. Let ρ be represented by (μ, u). Then ρ satisﬁes Decreasing Impatience if
and only if for all t ∈ T , μ-a.s. D (t+ 2) = 0 or
D (t)
D (t+ 1)
≥ D (t+ 1)
D (t+ 2)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Stochastic Stationarity along with Decreasing Impatience are necessary and suﬃcient
for a random exponential discounting model.
Theorem 3. Let ρ be represented by (μ, u). Then μ is exponential if and only if ρ satisﬁes
Stochastic Stationarity and Decreasing Impatience.
18Technically, Decreasing Impatience is the intertemporal analog of the extremeness axiom from Gul and
Pesendorfer (2006). See Appendix B for a precise statement of this relationship.
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Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In the case when ρ is deterministic, we can obtain a model of exponential discounting
from the classical stationarity axiom alone. Thus, the fact that Decreasing Impatience is
needed for random exponential discounting is a feature unique to random intertemporal
choice.19 To illustrate this, we provide an example of random discounting that satisﬁes
Stochastic Stationarity but is not exponential.20 This clariﬁes the importance of Decreas-
ing Impatience in random intertemporal choice. For each ω ∈ [0, 1] deﬁne
Dω(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩ e
−2n if t = 2n,
e−2n−
1
2
−ω if t = 2n+ 1.
In other words, Dω =
(
1, e−
1
2
−ω, e−2, e−
5
2
−ω, e−4, e−
9
2
−ω, . . .
)
. Let μ be a random dis-
counting representation which is uniform over {Dω | ω ∈ [0, 1]}.
43210
t
0
logDω(t)
−2
−4
logD1
logD0
Figure 4.1: Non Exponential μ which satisﬁes Stochastic Stationarity
19One may wonder what restrictions on discount functions Stochastic Stationarity by itself implies. For every
discount function D and set of time periods J ⊂ T , let (D˜t)t∈J denote the normalized discount rates at each
t ∈ J . Then Stochastic Stationarity is equivalent to (D˜t)t∈J having the same distributions as (D˜t+s)t∈J for all
s ∈ T and J ⊂ T .
20For an example of random discounting that satisﬁes Decreasing Impatience but is not exponential, suppose
D(t) = δt
2
for some δ. This shows that Stochastic Stationarity and Decreasing Impatience are independent
axioms.
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Proposition 2. (i) μ is not exponential but satisﬁes Stochastic Stationarity; (ii) μ vi-
olates Decreasing Impatience, and its random choice cannot have a random exponential
representation.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The formal proof is in the Appendix. Given Proposition 1, Figure 4.1 clearly shows that
μ violates Decreasing Impatience. We now provide a sketch of why μ satisﬁes Stochastic
Stationarity. If t is even, then (Dω(t), Dω(t + 1), . . . ) = e−t(Dω(0), Dω(1), . . . ). Then,
for any f, g ∈ H, Dω · (u ◦ f t) ≥ Dω · (u ◦ gt) ⇔ Dω · (u ◦ f) ≥ Dω · (u ◦ g). Note that
this equivalence is captured in Figure 4.1 by the fact that the slope of logDω is the same
between periods from 0 to 1 and periods from 3 to 4. Therefore, when t is even, each
realization Dω predicts no violation of the deterministic stationarity axiom.
If t is odd, then (Dω(t), Dω(t + 1), . . . ) = e−t(D1−ω(0), D1−ω(1), . . . ). Then, for any
f, g ∈ H, Dω · (u ◦ f t) ≥ Dω · (u ◦ gt) ⇔ D1−ω · (u ◦ f) ≥ D1−ω · (u ◦ g). Note that
this equivalence is captured in Figure 4.1 by the fact that the slope of logD1 between
periods from 0 to 1 is the same as the slope of logD0 between periods from 1 to 2.
Therefore when t is odd, Dω predicts a violation of the deterministic stationarity axiom
if and only if D1−ω predicts the opposite direction of the violation. The two reversals
cancel each other out and "on average", deterministic stationarity is satisﬁed implying
that Stochastic Stationarity is satisﬁed. Hence (i) holds. To see why (ii) holds suppose
by way of contradiction that μ induces a random choice that has a random exponential
representation. Since the discounting function at periods 2 and 4 are deterministic, choice
must be deterministic at those periods and also at other periods such as 1 and 3, yielding
a contradiction.
For the random quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, we need to weaken Stochastic
Stationarity. In particular, suppose that Stochastic Stationarity holds only when menus
are delayed by at least one period.
Axiom (Weak Stochastic Stationarity). For any F ∈ K and t ≥ 1,
ρF 1
(
f1
)
= ρF t
(
f t
)
.
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The deterministic version of this axiom has appeared in Hayashi (2003) and Olea and
Strzalecki (2014). In our model, Weak Stochastic Stationarity along with Decreasing Im-
patience exactly characterize random quasi-hyperbolic discounting. As mentioned above,
Decreasing Impatience is unnecessary if choices are deterministic.
Theorem 4. Let ρ be represented by (μ, u). Then μ is quasi-hyperbolic if and only if ρ
satisﬁes Weak Stochastic Stationarity and Decreasing Impatience.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
5 Comparative Statics
We now present some comparative statics for our random discounting model. First, for
any RCR ρ with a Random Discounting representation, let bρ and wρ denote its best
and worst consumptions respectively. For any a ∈ [0, 1], we can deﬁne the lottery paρ :=
abρ+(1− a)wρ. Note that paρ is a normalized utility that allows us to compare valuations
across random choices with diﬀerent tastes.
Consider two consumption streams f and g such that f provides a lower payoﬀ than
g in time period t1 but a higher payoﬀ than g in a later period t2 > t1. In any other time
period, f and g are the same. Thus, f and g diﬀer at two time periods and f is more
back-loaded than to g. We say one RCR is stochastically more patient than another if the
probability that the ﬁrst chooses consumption stream f over g is always greater than the
second.
Deﬁnition. ρ is stochastically more patient than τ if for any f, g, f ′, g′ ∈ H, a1 < b1,
a2 > b2 and t1 < t2 such that f (ti) = paiρ , g (ti) = pbiρ , f ′ (ti) = paiτ , g′ (ti) = pbiτ for
i ∈ {1, 2} and f (s) = g (s), f ′ (s) = g′ (s) for all s ∈ {t1, t2}, then
ρ (f, g) ≥ τ (f ′, g′) .
Given two discount distributions μ and ν, let μ  ν denote the fact that for all
t1, t2 ∈ T such that t1 < t2 the distribution of D (t2) /D (t1) under μ ﬁrst-order stochas-
tically dominates (FOSD) its distribution under ν. This exactly captures the ordering
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of distributions of discount factors according to the level of patience. We now have the
following result.
Proposition 3. Let ρ and τ be represented by (μ, u) and (ν, v) respectively. Then μ  ν
if and only if ρ is stochastically more patient than τ .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can normalize u and v such that u (bρ) = v (bτ ) = 1
and u (wρ) = v (wτ ) = 0. Deﬁne f, g, f ′, g′ ∈ H, a1 < b1, a2 > b2 and t1 < t2 as in the
deﬁnition of more stochastic patience. Thus,
ρ (f, g) ≥ τ (f ′, g′)
⇔ μ {D ∈ D | D (t1) a1 +D (t2) a2 ≥ D (t1) b1 +D (t2) b2 }
≥ ν {D ∈ D | D (t1) a1 +D (t2) a2 ≥ D (t1) b1 +D (t2) b2 }
⇔ μ {D ∈ D | D (t1) (b1 − a1) ≤ D (t2) (a2 − b2)}
≥ ν {D ∈ D | D (t1) (b1 − a1) ≤ D (t2) (a2 − b2)} ,
Since a1 < b1 and a2 > b2 , the result follows.
Note that this immediately implies the following result that allows us to perform FOSD
comparisons of exponential discount distributions using random choice.
Corollary 1. Let ρ and τ be represented by (μ, u) and (ν, v) respectively where both μ and
ν are exponential. Then μ FOSD ν if and only if ρ is stochastically more patient than τ .
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 3 above.
One may wonder if it would be possible to generalize our deﬁnition of greater stochas-
tic patience. Under deterministic choice, our notion of greater patience is equivalent to
exhibiting a greater preference for f over g whenever f single-crosses g from below, that is,
there exists some t∗ such that f gives a lower (higher) payoﬀ than g when t ≤ t∗ (t ≥ t∗).21
In stochastic choice however, this equivalence fails. In other words, it is no longer true
that μ  ν if and only if ρ (f, g) ≥ τ (f, g) for consumption steams f and g where f
single-crosses g from below. The following example illustrates.
21See Benoit and Ok (2007).
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Example 1. Let D1 =
(
1, 12 ,
1
2 , 0, . . .
)
, D2 = (1, 1, 0, 0, . . . ), D′1 =
(
1, 12 , 0, 0, . . .
)
and
D′2 =
(
1, 1, 12 , 0, . . .
)
Suppose μ = 12δD1 +
1
2δD2 and ν =
1
2δD′1 +
1
2δD′2 . Let ρ and τ be
represented by (μ, u) and (ν, v) respectively. It is easy to check that μ  ν. Consider
f, g ∈ H such that
u ◦ f = (0, 1, 1, 0, . . . )
u ◦ g =
(
5
4
, 0, 0, 0, . . .
)
and note that f single-crosses g from below. However, note that
ρ (f, g) = 0 <
1
2
= τ (f, g) .
6 Extension
6.1 Random vN-M Utility
In this section, we consider a general model where there is randomness in both discounting
and utilities. Idiosyncratic shocks to the economy may change the agent’s perception of
future consumption (i.e. discounting function) as well as his taste (i.e. vNM utility). One
important question is to ask whether it is possible to distinguish the randomness of the
discounting function from the randomness of the vNM utility. To address the question, we
ﬁrst provide an axiomatic characterization of the general model and then show that this
distinction is possible.
We introduce new primitives as follows. Let U denote the set of vNM utilities on ΔX.
Although utilities are random, we still need to assume that there exists some universally
worst consumption. For instance, there may be shocks to risk aversion but the agent still
prefers more money to less. Fix some outcome w ∈ X and let U∗ ⊂ U denote the set
of non-constant utilities such that u (x) ≥ u (w) for all x ∈ X. The existence of a worst
consumption w also allows us to deﬁne delayed streams.
Deﬁnition. ρ is said to have a General Random Discounting Representation if there exists
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a regular measure π on D × U∗ such that22
ρF (f) = π
{
(D,u) ∈ D × U∗
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t
D (t) [u (f (t))− u (g (t))] ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F
}
.
In this case, we say ρ is represented by π. Since tastes are random in a General Random
Discounting representation, Initial Determinism clearly cannot be satisﬁed. Nevertheless,
the following condition ensures that w is a worst consumption.
Axiom (Worst). ρ (f1w,w) = 1 for all f ∈ H.
With this condition, we can deﬁne delayed streams as before and Impatience is well-
deﬁned. The next axiom ensures that utilities are time-invariant. It states that constant
consumption streams are always chosen over streams with time-varying payoﬀs.23
Axiom (Time Invariance). For t ∈ T , suppose that f (s) ∈ {p, q} ⊂ ΔX for all f ∈ F
and all s ≤ t. If p, q ∈ F ,24 then
ρFtw ({ptw, qtw}) = 1
Finally, we assume a nondegeneracy condition for initial consumptions. Analogous to
Nondegeneracy, this rules out the case where the agent is indiﬀerent between all initial
consumptions at time 0.
Axiom (Initial Nondegeneracy). ρF1w (f1w) < 1 for some F and some f ∈ F .
The following is the representation result for a General Random Discounting Repre-
sentation.
Theorem 5. ρ has a General Random Discounting Representation if and only if it satisﬁes
Monotonicity, Linearity, Extremeness, Continuity, Initial Nondegeneracy, Worst, Time
Invariance, and Impatience.
22As before, regularity means that the random utilities of two consumption streams are either always or never
equal.
23Time Invariance is the random choice analog of the classic state-by-state independence condition in subjec-
tive expected utility.
24Here, we use the convention where p and q refer to the constant consumption streams corresponding to
their respective lotteries.
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Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Finally, the following uniqueness result generalizes Theorem 1 to General Random
Discounting. To see this, note that we can identify the utility shocks from streams that
only have consumption at some ﬁxed time period. We can then identify the discount
shocks as any randomness above and beyond that generated by the utility shocks.
Theorem 6. Let ρ and τ be represented by π and η respectively. Then π = η if and only
if ρ (f, g) = τ (f, g) for all f, g ∈ H.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
This shows that the joint distribution of discounting and utilities can be recovered from
random choice. Moreover, as before, binary choice data will suﬃce for this identiﬁcation
exercise. For instance, if we interpret the random choice as reﬂecting repeated choices
of an individual, then we can detect when two agents exhibit the same randomness in
discounting attitudes but one agent’s utility is more random than that of the other. We
can also be used to provide some measurement that captures the degree to which utilities
vary across decision times.
6.2 Dynamic Random Choice
In the previous sections, we assumed that the agent’s choices are static and made only at
period 0. In this section, we study the agent’s dynamic choice. We extend our primitive
as follows. For each t ∈ T , let Ht denote the set of all consumption streams endowed with
the product topology which yield the outcome w for each period s ∈ T such that s ≤ t−1.
We denote by Kt the set of all menus of consumption streams endowed with the Hausdorﬀ
metric which yield the outcome w for each period s ∈ T such that s ≤ t− 1.
Deﬁnition. For each t ∈ T , ρt is a function from Kt → Δ(Ht) such that ρtF (F ) = 1. We
call ρt the random choice rule (RCR) at period t ∈ T .
The observable data set now consists of {ρt}t∈T . The RCR ρ in the previous sections
can be understood as ρ0. As before, we interpret the random choice ρt as ex-ante choice ob-
served at period t. Also as before, this can be interpreted as either an individual’s random
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choice or aggregated random choice across population of agents. The latter interpretation
applies in experimental settings where random choice corresponds to aggregated choices.
For example, in Halevy (2015), subjects are asked to choose between a sooner but smaller
consumption and a later but larger consumption at two diﬀerent time periods (i.e., week
0, week 4). The aggregated choices are random because of the unobserved heterogeneity
of subjects from the perspective of the outside observer. By aggregating choices across the
subjects at the two time periods, we can elicit ρweek0 and ρweek4. Note that in all these
settings, we interpret the worst outcome as "no consumption".
For each t ∈ T , we can impose the same axioms on ρt as in the previous sections just
by changing K to Kt. One new axiom is a natural extension of the dynamic consistency
axiom to the stochastic setting.
Axiom. (Stochastic Dynamic Consistency) For any t, s ∈ T such that t < s, for any
F ∈ Ks and any f ∈ F ,
ρtF (f) = ρ
s
F (f).
Since F ∈ Ks, the agent’s payoﬀ is constant, namely zero, between period t and s− 1.
As a result, if the agent is dynamically consistent, then he should not change his choice
at period s after making his choice at period t. Hence, we require that ρtF (f) = ρ
s
F (f).
Proposition 4. {ρt}t∈T satisﬁes Stochastic Dynamic Consistency and for each t ∈ T , ρt
satisﬁes the axioms in Theorems 2 and 3 (deﬁned with Kt instead of K) if and only if there
exists a probability measure μ on [0, 1] and a vN-M function u on ΔX such that for all
t ∈ T , F ∈ Kt, and f ∈ F
ρtF (f) = μ
⎧⎨
⎩δ ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s∈T :s≥t
δs−tu (f (s)) ≥
∑
s∈T :s≥t
δs−tu (g (s)) for all g ∈ F
⎫⎬
⎭ .
(6.1)
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Here, we show that {ρt}t∈T satisﬁes Stochastic Dynamic Consistency. Fix any t, s′ ∈ T
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such that t < s′. Choose any F ∈ Ks′ and any f ∈ F ,
ρtF (f) = μ
{
δ ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣ ∑s∈T :s≥t δs−tu (f (s)) ≥∑s∈T :s≥t δs−tu (g (s)) for all g ∈ F }
= μ{δ ∈ [0, 1] | ∑s∈T :s≥s′ δs−tu (f (s)) ≥∑s∈T :s≥s′ δs−tu (g (s)) for all g ∈ F}
(∵ u(h(s)) = 0 for all h ∈ F and s ∈ T such that t ≤ s ≤ s′ − 1)
= μ
{
δ ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣ δs′−t∑s∈T :s≥s′ δs−s′u (f (s)) ≥ δs′−t∑s∈T :s≥s′ δs−s′u (g (s)) for all g ∈ F }
= μ
{
δ ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣ ∑s∈T :s≥s′ δs−s′u (f (s)) ≥∑s∈T :s≥s′ δs−s′u (g (s)) for all g ∈ F }
= ρs
′
F (f) .
(6.2)
To understand why Stochastic Dynamic Consistency is suﬃcient, note that by Theorem
1, it implies that the marginal distributions of the discount functions after a common time
period are the same. Random exponential discounting then ensures that the distribution
of δ must be the same.
Note that the same extension is impossible for the Random Discounting model deﬁned
in Section 2.2 where the utility is ﬁxed and the discounting function is random and may
not necessarily be exponential. This is because Stochastic Dynamic Consistency may be
violated. To see this, note that the third equation of (6.2) may not hold with a general
discounting function.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Recall that T = {0, 1, . . . ,∞}. For every D ∈ [0, 1]T , f ∈ H, and vN-M utility function u
on ΔX, we use the condensed notation
D · (u ◦ f) :=
∞∑
t=0
D (t)u (f (t))
whenever the limit is well-deﬁned, which may be inﬁnite. Note that this converges for
all D ∈ D since ∑s>tD (s) → 0 as t → ∞ and u is bounded since X is ﬁnite. Given
consumption streams f, g ∈ H and t ∈ T , recall the spliced consumption stream
ftg (s) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
f (s) if s < t,
g (s− t) if s ≥ t.
For any F ∈ K, Ftg = {ftg ∈ H | f ∈ F} denotes the spliced menu. Finally, recall that
we use ρ (f, g) to denote ρ{f,g} (f) for any f, g ∈ H.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let ρ and τ be represented by (μ, u) and (ν, v) respectively. Note that if part (3) is true,
then ρF (f) = τF (f) for all f ∈ H from the representation. Moreover, since ρ (f, g) =
ρ (g, f) = 1 iﬀ τ (f, g) = τ (g, f) = 1 iﬀ f and g are tied, both RCRs have the same ties
so ρ = τ and part (2) is true. Since part (2) implies part (1) trivially, we have that (3)
implies (2) and (2) implies (1).
Hence, all that remains is to prove that part (1) implies part (3). Suppose (1) is
true so ρ (f, g) = τ (f, g) for all f, g ∈ H. First, note that for any p, q, r ∈ ΔX,
u (p) ≥ u (q) ⇔ μ {D ∈ D | u (p) ≥ u (q)} = 1 ⇔ ρ (p1r, q1r) = 1 ⇔ τ (p1r, q1r) =
1 ⇔ τ {D ∈ D | v (p) ≥ v (q)} = 1 ⇔ v (p) ≥ v (q), so u = αv + β for some α > 0 and a
real number β. Without loss of generality, we can let u = v and w ∈ ΔX be the worst
stream for both ρ and τ . Fix some ﬁnite J ⊂ T and let f ∈ H be such that f (t) = w for
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all t ∈ J . Let p ∈ ΔX such that u (p) = v (p) = a ∈ [0, 1] and note that
μ
{
D ∈ D
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t∈J
D (t)u (f (t)) ≥ a
}
= ρ (f, p1w)
= τ (f, p1w)
= ν
{
D ∈ D
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t∈J
D (t) v (f (t)) ≥ a
}
.
Since this is true for all a ∈ [0, 1] and such f , it must be that the distribution of∑
t∈J D (t) z (t) for all z ∈ [0, 1]J must be the same under μ and ν. Note we can eas-
ily extend this for all z ∈ RJ+ by scaling so by the Cramer-Wold Theorem,25 (D (t))t∈J has
the same distribution under μ and ν.26 Since this is true for all J ⊂ T , by Kolmogorov’s
Extension Theorem, μ = ν. This proves (3).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
A.2.1 Worst Consumption Stream is Well-Deﬁned
We ﬁrst prove that the worst consumption stream w is well-deﬁned. First, we prove a
technical lemma showing that under linearity, we can show the following.
Lemma 1. If ρ satisﬁes Linearity, then ρ (p1f, q1f) = ρ (p1g, q1g) for all p, q ∈ ΔX and
f, g ∈ H.
Proof. Let r := 12p+
1
2q and note that
1
2
(p1f) +
1
2
(q1g) = r1
(
1
2
f +
1
2
g
)
=
1
2
(p1g) +
1
2
(q1f) ,
1
2
(q1f) +
1
2
(q1g) = q1
(
1
2
f +
1
2
g
)
=
1
2
(q1g) +
1
2
(q1f) .
25See Billingsley (1986).
26For each z ∈ RJ+ we can ﬁnd k ∈ Z++ such that z/k ∈ [0, 1]J because J is ﬁnite. Deﬁne μ(D ∈ DJ |D · z ≥
a) = μ(D ∈ DJ |D · (z/k) ≥ a/k). Note that the deﬁnition does not depend on k.
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By Linearity, this implies that
ρ (p1f, q1f) = ρ
(
1
2
(p1f) +
1
2
(q1g) ,
1
2
(q1f) +
1
2
(q1g)
)
= ρ
(
1
2
(p1g) +
1
2
(q1f) ,
1
2
(q1g) +
1
2
(q1f)
)
= ρ (p1g, q1g)
as desired.
We can now show that the worst consumption stream w ∈ H is well-deﬁned.
Lemma 2. Suppose ρ satisﬁes Monotonicity, Linearity, Extremeness, Continuity and Ini-
tial Determinism. Then there exists a constant consumption stream w ∈ H such that
ρ (f1g, w1g) = 1 for all f, g ∈ H.
Proof. Fix some consumption lottery r ∈ ΔX. Consider the random choice rule τ on ΔX
such that for any ﬁnite set of lotteries C ⊂ ΔX and p ∈ C,
τC (p) = ρC1r (p1r) .
Note that by Initial Determinism, τ is deterministic. Hence, from Lu (2016), τ can be
represented by a deterministic expected utility u on ΔX. Let w ∈ ΔX be some worst
lottery according to u. Note that w exists as X is ﬁnite. Let w ∈ H denote the constant
consumption stream that yields w every period. From Lemma 1, this implies that for any
f, g ∈ H, ρ (f1g, w1g) = ρ (f1r, w1r) = τ (f (0) , w) = 1, as desired.
A.2.2 Suﬃciency of Theorem 2
In order to prove that a Random Discounting Representation exists, we ﬁrst prove it exists
for a subset of menus. For each ﬁnite J ⊂ T such that 0 ∈ J , let HJ be the subset of
streams such that f (t) = w for all t ∈ J , where the existence of w follows from Lemma
2. Let KJ ⊂ K be the subset of menus that only contain streams in HJ . Hence, we can
deﬁne a RCR ρJ on KJ such that for all F ∈ KJ and f ∈ F ,
ρJF (f) = ρF (f) .
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By the same argument as in Lu (2016), for every ﬁnite J , we can ﬁnd a measure νJ on
ΔJ and a vN-M utility u on ΔX such that for every F ∈ KJ and f ∈ F
ρJF (f) = ν
J {p ∈ ΔJ | p · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F}
Note that Initial Determinism and Time Monotonicity imply that this u is ﬁxed and
independent of J . We normalize u : ΔX → [0, 1] such that u (w) = 0. Choose f ∈ H such
that u (f (t)) = 1 for some t ∈ T and f (s) = w for all s = t. Then by Impatience, for any
J such that {t, t+ 1} ⊂ J , we have
1 = ρ
(
f, f1
)
= ρJ
(
f, f1
)
= νJ {p ∈ ΔJ | p (t) ≥ p (t+ 1)} .
Hence, p is decreasing νJ -a.s. for all ﬁnite J where 0 ∈ J . For any J ⊂ T such that 0 ∈ J ,
let DJ ⊂ [0, 1]J be such that D (0) = 1 for all D ∈ DJ . We can deﬁne a measure μJ on
DJ such that for every F ∈ KJ and f ∈ F ,
ρJF (f) = μ
J
{
D ∈ DJ ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F} .
We now extend this representation from any ﬁnite J to all of T by using Kolmogorov’s
Extension Theorem. Hence, we need to check for the following consistency condition. Let
0 ∈ S ⊂ J ⊂ T . For any F ∈ KS and f ∈ F , μS {D ∈ DS ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F} =
ρSF (f) = ρF (f) = ρ
J
F (f) = μ
J
{
D ∈ DJ ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F}.
Let f ∈ HS and p ∈ ΔX such that u (p) = a ∈ [0, 1]. Since p1w ∈ HS , we then have
μS
{
D ∈ DS ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f) ≥ a} = μJ {D ∈ DJ ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f) ≥ a} .
In other words, for all z ∈ [0, 1]S , the distribution of D · z under μS is the same as that
under μJ . As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can easily extend this for all z ∈ RS+ so by
Cramer-Wold, it must be that μS is exactly the projection of μJ on DS . Formally, if we
let χJS : DJ → DS be the projection mapping from DJ to DS , then
μS = μJ ◦ χ−1JS .
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Hence, from Kolmogorov’s Extension Theorem, we know there exists a measure μ on DT
such that for any ﬁnite J ⊂ T and F ∈ KJ ,
ρF (f) = μ
J
{
D ∈ DJ ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F}
= μ
{
D ∈ DT ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F} .
Moreover, we can assume that μ is a measure on the Borel σ-algebra corresponding to
pointwise convergence on the product topology (see exercise I.6.35 of Cinlar (2011)).
We now need to generalize the representation for all F ∈ K. First, for every f ∈ F ∈ K
and ﬁnite t ∈ T , deﬁne the following two sets of maximizing discount functions
N (f, F ) := {D ∈ DT ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F} ,
N t (f, F ) := {D ∈ DT ∣∣ D · (u ◦ (ftw)− u ◦ (gtw)) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F} .
Note that N (f, F ) is well-deﬁned only if D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) is well-deﬁned for all f, g ∈ F .
Lemma 3. Suppose D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) is well-deﬁned for all f, g ∈ F and D ∈ DT . Then
(1) ρF (f) = μ (N (f, F )) for all f ∈ F ,
(2) μ
{
D ∈ DT ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) = 0} ∈ {0, 1} for all f, g ∈ F .
Proof. We ﬁrst show that if the premise holds, then ρF (f) ≤ μ (N (f, F )). In order to
show this, we prove that lim supt 1N t(f,F ) (D) ≤ 1N (f,F ) (D) for all D ∈ DT . Suppose
lim supt 1N t(f,F ) (D) = 1 so for any t ∈ T , we can ﬁnd some t′ > t where D ∈ N t′ (f, F )
or ∑
s≤t′
D (s) · (u (f (s))− u (g (s))) ≥ 0
for all g ∈ F . Since D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) is well-deﬁned for all f, g ∈ F and D ∈ DT , this
implies that
D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) = lim
t
∑
s≤t
D (s) · (u (f (s))− u (g (s))) ≥ 0
for all g ∈ F so D ∈ N (f, F ). Hence, lim supt 1N t(f,F ) (D) ≤ 1N (f,F ) (D). Recall that
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Ftw = {ftw|f ∈ F}. Now, by Fatou’s Lemma,
lim
t
ρFtw (ftw) = lim
t
μ
(N t (f, F ))
≤
∫
DT
lim sup
t
1N t(f,F ) (D)μ (dD)
≤
∫
DT
1N (f,F ) (D)μ (dD) = μ (N (f, F ))
Since Ftw → F , by Continuity, this implies that
ρF (f) = lim
t
ρFtw (ftw) ≤ μ (N (f, F )) (A.1)
as desired.
Before completing the proof of part (1), we will now prove part (2). Fix f, g ∈ F
and note that if f and g are tied, then from equation (A.1), we have 1 = ρ (f, g) ≤
μ (N (f, {f, g})) and 1 = ρ (g, f) ≤ μ (N (g, {f, g})) so μ{D ∈ DT ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) = 0} =
1.
Now, suppose f and g are not tied. Let r ∈ ΔX be such that u (r) = 1. By linearity,
we can assume without loss of generality that 12u (f (0)) +
1
2u (g (0)) < u (r). For any
ε > 0, let pε ∈ ΔX be such that u (pε) = 12u (f (0)) + 12u (g (0)) + ε and deﬁne hε ∈ H
such that hε (0) = pε and hε (t) = 12f (t) +
1
2g (t) for all t > 0. Now, for all D ∈ DT ,
D·(u ◦ f − u ◦ hε) = D·
(
u ◦ f − u ◦
(
1
2
f +
1
2
g
)
− (ε, 0, 0, . . . )
)
=
1
2
D·(u ◦ f − u ◦ g)−ε,
which is well-deﬁned as D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) is well-deﬁned.
By symmetric argument, D · (u ◦ g − u ◦ hε) = 12D · (u ◦ g − u ◦ f)− ε. For all positive
number ε, deﬁne Fε = {f, g, hε}. Then,
N (f, Fε) =
{
D ∈ DT ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 2ε} ,
N (g, Fε) =
{
D ∈ DT ∣∣ D · (u ◦ g − u ◦ f) ≥ 2ε} .
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Note that N (f, Fε) ∩N (g, Fε) = Ø as ε > 0. Now, from equation (A.1) again, we have
ρFε (f) + ρFε (g) ≤ μ (N (f, Fε)) + μ (N (g, Fε)) = μ (N (f, Fε) ∪N (g, Fε)) ≤ 1.
Consider a sequence of menus Fεi as εi → 0. Suppose there are three menus Fεi , Fεj ,
and Fεk in this sequence that are not in K0. Since f and g are not tied, it must be that
hεi , hεj , and hεk are tied with f or g, respectively. Therefore, there exist l, l
′ ∈ {i, j, k}
such that hεl and hεl′ are tied with f or both of them are tied with g. Without loss
of generality, we assume that hεj and hεk are both tied with f (the case for both tied
with g is symmetric). Hence, hεj and hεk must be tied, so hεj and
1
2f +
1
2g must be
tied. By Linearity, this implies that r1w is tied with w, contradicting the representation
from above. Hence, there cannot be more than two menus in this sequence that are not
in K0. So we can always remove menus Fεi that are not in K0. Hence, we can assume
that Fεi ∈ K0 for all i without loss of generality. By Continuity, we thus have that
1 = ρ (f, g)+ρ (g, f) = limi
(
ρFεi (f) + ρFεi (g)
)
≤ limi μ (N (f, Fεi) ∪N (g, Fεi)). Hence,
μ
{
D ∈ DT ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) = 0} = lim
i
μ
{
D ∈ DT ∣∣ − 2εi < D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) < 2εi}
= 1− lim
i
μ (N (f, Fεi) ∪N (g, Fεi)) = 0.
This proves part (2) of the lemma.
We now return to the proof of part (1). Suppose that the inequality in equation (A.1)
is strict for some f ∈ F . Let F ∗ ⊂ F be the subset of streams in F that are not tied and
f ∈ F . If we sum over all the non-tied streams F ∗, then
1 =
∑
g∈F ∗
ρF (g) <
∑
g∈F ∗
μ (N (g, F )) ≤ 1,
where the last inequality follows from part (2) as F ∗ contains no ties.
Since this cannot be true, it must be that ρF (f) = μ (N (f, F )) for all f ∈ F . This
completes the proof for the lemma.
We now complete the suﬃciency proof. Let r ∈ ΔX such that u (r) = 1 and note that
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wtr → w as t → ∞. Now, for every D ∈ DT ,
St (D) := D · (u ◦ (wtr)) =
∑
s≥t
D (s)
is well-deﬁned, which may be inﬁnite. Hence, by part (1) of Lemma 3 and Continuity,
we have 1 = limt ρ (w,wtr) = limt μ
{
D ∈ DT | St (D) = 0
}
, as {w,wtr} → {w}. Since
S is decreasing in t, limt→∞ St is well-deﬁned, although it could be inﬁnite. Moreover, if
St (D) = 0 for some t ∈ T , then limt′→∞ St′ (D) ≤ St (D) = 0. So for all D ∈ DT ,
lim sup
t
1{St(D)=0} (D) ≤ 1{limt→∞ St(D)=0} (D) .
By Fatou’s Lemma again,
1 = lim
t
∫
DT
1{St(D)=0} (D)μ (dD)
≤
∫
DT
lim sup
t
1{St(D)=0} (D)μ (dD)
≤
∫
DT
1{limt→∞ St(D)=0} (D)μ (dD) = μ
{
D ∈ DT
∣∣∣ lim
t→∞St (D) = 0
}
.
Hence, limt→∞
∑
s≥tD (s) = 0 μ-a.s.. Note this implies that D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) con-
verges for all f, g ∈ F . Since D is decreasing μ-a.s. follows trivially from Impatience,
μ (D) = 1. Hence, by part (1) of Lemma 3, we have for all F ∈ K and f ∈ F ,
ρF (f) = μ {D ∈ D | D · (u ◦ f) ≥ D · (u ◦ g) for all g ∈ F} .
Moreover, the regularity of μ follows from part (2) of Lemma 3. We thus have a Random
Discounting Representation as desired.
A.2.3 Necessity of Theorem 2
We now prove necessity of the axioms under a Random Discounting Representation. Note
that Monotonicity, Linearity, Extremeness and Nondegeneracy follows by similar argument
as in Lu (2016). To see Initial Determinism, note that if f (t) = g (t) for all t > 0 and
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f, g ∈ F , then for any f ∈ F , ρF (f) = μ {D ∈ D | u (f (0)) ≥ u (g (0)) for all g ∈ F} ∈
{0, 1} , as desired. To see Time Monotonicity, note that for f ∈ F , if u (f (t)) ≥ u (g (t))
for all g ∈ F , ρF (f) = μ {D ∈ D | D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F} = 1, as desired.
To see Impatience, note that
ρ
(
f, f t
)
= μ
{
D ∈ D | D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ f t) ≥ 0}
= μ
{
D ∈ D |
∑
s∈T
(D (s)−D (s+ t))u(f (s)) ≥ 0
}
= 1
as D is decreasing μ-a.s..
Finally, we prove Continuity. Let Fk → F where Fk, F ∈ K0. Note that for any
f, g ∈ Fk, f and g are not tied. Since μ is regular, this implies that D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) = 0
with μ-measure zero. Now, deﬁne
I :=
⋃
f,g∈Fk∪F
{D ∈ D | D · (u ◦ f) = D · (u ◦ g)}
as the set of all discount functions that rank some f, g ∈ Fk ∪ F as the same. Note that
μ (I) = 0 so if we let D∗ := D\I, then μ (D∗) = 1. Let μ∗ be the restriction of μ on D∗.
We will now deﬁne random variables ξk : D∗ → H and ξ : D∗ → H that have distributions
ρFk and ρF respectively. For each Fk, let ξk : D∗ → H be such that
ξk (D) := argmax
f∈Fk
D · (u ◦ f)
and deﬁne ξ similarly for F . Note that these are well-deﬁned because there exists a unique
maximizer f for D ∈ D∗. For any measurable set E ⊂ H,
ξ−1k (E) = {D ∈ D∗| ξk (D) ∈ E ∩ Fk}
=
⋃
f∈E∩Fk
{D ∈ D∗|D · (u ◦ f) > D · (u ◦ g) ∀g ∈ Fk}
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which is measurable. Hence, ξk and ξ are random variables. Note that
μ∗ ◦ ξ−1k (E)
=
∑
f∈E∩Fk
μ∗ {D ∈ D∗|D · (u ◦ f) > D · (u ◦ g) ∀g ∈ Fk}
=
∑
f∈E∩Fk
μ {D ∈ D|D · (u ◦ f) ≥ D · (u ◦ g) ∀g ∈ Fk}
= ρFk (E ∩ Fk)
= ρFk (E)
so ρFk and ρF are the distributions of ξk and ξ respectively. Note that for any D ∈ D∗ ⊂ D,
D · (u ◦ f) is bounded and thus continuous in f . Hence, by the Maximum Theorem,
ξk (D) = argmaxf∈Fk D · (u ◦ f) is upper hemi-continuous in Fk. Since ξk is single-valued,
ξk is continuous as a function of Fk. Since Fk → F , ξk → ξ μ∗-a.s.. Finally, since a.s.
convergence implies convergence in distribution, ρFk → ρF as desired.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
A.3.1 Suﬃciency Proposition 1
Let ρ be represented by (μ, u) and suppose satisﬁes Decreasing Impatience. Choose r ∈
ΔX such that u (r) = 1. Deﬁne h ∈ H such that h (2) = r, and h (s) = w for all
s = 2. Also, for any a ∈ (0, 1], deﬁne fa, ga ∈ H such that ga = ah−1 + (1− a)w and
fa = ag
−1
a +(1− a)w. Hence, we can write down the utility streams for fa, ga, h as follows:
u ◦ h = (0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ) , u ◦ ga = (0, a, 0, 0, . . . ) , u ◦ fa =
(
a2, 0, 0, 0, . . .
)
.
Moreover, for any t ∈ T , the utility streams for the t-delayed streams f ta, gta, ht are as
follows:
u ◦ ht = (0, . . . 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ) , u ◦ gta = (0, . . . 0, a, 0, 0, . . . ) , u ◦ f ta =
(
0, . . . a2, 0, 0, 0, . . .
)
,
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where h (2) = r. Note that for D ∈ D
D · (u ◦ ht) = D (t+ 2) , D · (u ◦ gta) = D (t+ 1) a, D · (u ◦ f ta) = D (t) a2.
Fix t ∈ T and let F ta :=
{
f ta, g
t
a, h
t
}
for any a > 0.
Because of the regularity, note that either D (t+ 1) = 0 μ-a.s. or D (t+ 1) > 0 μ-
a.s..27 If D (t+ 1) = 0 μ-a.s., then Proposition 1 holds. So consider the latter case. Since
discount functions are decreasing, we know that D (t) ≥ D (t+ 1) > 0 μ-a.s.. We will now
show that μ-a.s.
D (t+ 1)
D (t)
≤ D (t+ 2)
D (t+ 1)
.
First, we show that there is at most one value a ∈ (0, 1] such that gta and ht are tied.
To see this suppose there exists b = a such that gtb and ht are tied. Then, since both gta
and gtb are tied with h
t, then D (t+ 1) a = D (t+ 1) b which implies that D (t+ 1) = 0
μ-a.s. a contradiction. Next, we show that there is at most one value a ∈ (0, 1] such that
gta and f ta are tied. To see this suppose there exists another b = a such that gtb and f tb
are tied. Then, we have D (t+ 1) = D (t) a and D (t+ 1) = D (t) b which implies that
D (t) = 0 μ-a.s. again a contradiction.
Therefore, for almost all a ∈ (0, 1], we have gta is not tied with f ta nor ht. Since F ta
contains no ties, by Decreasing Impatience,
0 = ρF ta
(
gta
)
= μ
{
D ∈ D ∣∣ D (t+ 1) a ≥ D (t+ 2) and D (t+ 1) a ≥ D (t) a2}
= μ
{
D ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ D (t+ 1)D (t) ≥ a ≥ D (t+ 2)D (t+ 1)
}
= μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≥ a ≥ Yt } ,
where we deﬁne Xt :=
D(t+1)
D(t) ≥ 0 and Yt := D(t+2)D(t+1) ≥ 0. Hence,
0 = μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≥ a ≥ Yt } .
27Consider a consumption stream f such that f(t+ 1) = r and f(s) = w for all s = t+ 1. By Determinism,
ρ(f, w) ∈ {0, 1}. If ρ(w, f) = 0, then D (t+ 1) > 0 μ-a.s.. Otherwise, D (t+ 1) = 0 μ-a.s..
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Since this is true for almost all a > 0, it must be that μ-a.s.
D (t+ 1)
D (t)
= Xt ≤ Yt = D (t+ 2)
D (t+ 1)
as desired.
A.3.2 Necessity of Proposition 1
Let ρ be represented by (μ, u). Suppose f = ag−1 + (1− a)w and g = ah−1 + (1− a)w.
Note that if g is tied with either f or h, then ρ{f,g,h} ({f, h}) = 1 trivially so suppose g is
not tied with f nor h. We will show that ρ{f,g,h} (g) = 0. Let T+ be the set of t ∈ T such
that D (t+ 1) > 0 μ-a.s.. Note that
D · (u ◦ g − u ◦ h) =
∑
t∈T
[D (t+ 1) a−D (t+ 2)]u (h (t+ 2))
≤
∑
t∈T+
[D (t+ 1) a−D (t+ 2)]u (h (t+ 2))
=
∑
t∈T+
D (t)
D (t+ 1)
D (t)
(
a− D (t+ 2)
D (t+ 1)
)
u (h (t+ 2))
≤
∑
t∈T+
D (t)
D (t+ 1)
D (t)
(
a− D (t+ 1)
D (t)
)
u (h (t+ 2))
since D(t+2)D(t+1) ≥ D(t+1)D(t) μ-a.s. for all t ∈ T+. Note that
D (t+ 1)
D (t)
(
a− D (t+ 1)
D (t)
)
≤ a
(
a− D (t+ 1)
D (t)
)
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so
D · (u ◦ g − u ◦ h) ≤
∑
t∈T+
D (t) a
(
a− D (t+ 1)
D (t)
)
u (h (t+ 2))
=
∑
t∈T+
(
D (t) a2 −D (t+ 1) a)u (h (t+ 2))
≤
∑
t∈T
(
D (t) a2 −D (t+ 1) a)u (h (t+ 2))
= D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) .
Thus, D · (u ◦ f) ≤ D · (u ◦ g) implies D · (u ◦ g) ≤ D · (u ◦ h) so ρ{f,g,h} (g) = 0 as desired.
A.4 Proof of Theorems 3 and 4
We will now prove Theorems 3 and 4. We will prove them in reverse order as Theorem 3
follows easily from Theorem 4. Let ρ be represented by (μ, u)
A.4.1 Necessity of Theorem 4
Suppose μ is quasi-hyperbolic. We will show that ρ satisﬁes Decreasing Impatience and
Weak Stochastic Stationary. Note that since μ is quasi-hyperbolic, for every t > 0
D (1)
D (0)
= βδ ≤ δ = D (t+ 1)
D (t)
Hence, ρ satisﬁes Decreasing Impatience by Proposition 1. We now prove Weak Stochastic
Stationarity. Now, for any t ≥ 1 and f, g ∈ F ,
D · (u ◦ f t − u ◦ gt) =∑
s
βδs+t [u (f (s))− u (g (s))]
= δt−1
∑
s
βδs+1 [u (f (s))− u (g (s))]
= δt−1
[
D · (u ◦ f1 − u ◦ g1)]
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Hence,
ρF t
(
f t
)
= μ
{
D ∈ D ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f t − u ◦ gt) ≥ 0 for all gt ∈ F t}
= μ
{
D ∈ D ∣∣D · (u ◦ f1 − u ◦ g1) ≥ 0 for all g1 ∈ F 1} = ρF 1 (f1)
so Weak Stochastic Stationarity is satisﬁed.
A.4.2 Necessity of Theorem 3
We now prove that if μ is exponential, then ρ must satisfy Decreasing Impatience and
Stochastic Stationarity. Note that Decreasing Impatience follows immediately from the
necessity proof of Theorem 4. To show Stochastic Stationarity, note that for any t ∈ T
and f, g ∈ F ,
D · (u ◦ f t − u ◦ gt) =∑
s∈T
δs+t [u (f (s))− u (g (s))] = δt [D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g)] .
Hence,
ρF t
(
f t
)
= μ
{
D ∈ D ∣∣ D · (u ◦ f t − u ◦ gt) ≥ 0 for all gt ∈ F t}
= μ {D ∈ D | D · (u ◦ f − u ◦ g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F } = ρF (f) ,
so Stochastic Stationarity is satisﬁed.
A.4.3 Suﬃciency of Theorem 4
We now prove the suﬃciency of Theorem 4. First, we show the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let ρ be represented by (μ, u).
(1) If ρ satisﬁes Weak Stochastic Stationarity, then for all t ≥ 1, μ {D ∈ D | D (1) = 0} =
μ {D ∈ D | D (t) = 0}.
(2) If ρ satisﬁes Stochastic Stationarity, then for all t ∈ T , μ {D ∈ D | D (t) = 0} = 0.
Proof. Suppose ρ is represented by (μ, u). Let r ∈ ΔX be such that u (r) = 1. We prove
the two cases separately.
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(1) First, suppose ρ satisﬁes Weak Stochastic Stationarity. Let f ∈ H be such that
f (0) = r and f (s) = w for all s > 0. Now, by Weak Stochastic Stationarity,
for any t ≥ 1, μ {D ∈ D | D (1) = 0} = ρ (w1, f1) = ρ (wt, f t) = ρ (w, f t) =
μ {D ∈ D | D (t) = 0}, as desired.
(2) Now, suppose ρ satisﬁes Stochastic Stationarity. If we let h ∈ H be such that
h (0) = r and h (s) = w for all s > 0, then by the same argument as above we
have μ {D ∈ D | D (0) = 0} = ρ (w, h) = ρ (wt, ht) = μ {D ∈ D | D (t) = 0}. Since
D (0) = 1, the result follows.
Since ρ satisﬁes Weak Stochastic Stationarity, from Lemma 4 and the fact that μ is
regular, we know that for all t ≥ 1,
μ {D ∈ D | D (t) = 0} = μ {D ∈ D | D (1) = 0} ∈ {0, 1} (A.2)
By this result, it suﬃces to consider the following two cases.
Case 1: μ {D ∈ D | D (1) = 0} = 1. Then by (A.2), μ {D ∈ D | D (t) = 0} = 1 for all
t ≥ 1. Then since T is countable, this implies that D (t) = 0 for all t ≥ 1 μ-a.s.. Hence,
ρF (f) = μ {D ∈ D | u (f (0)) ≥ u (g (0)) for all g ∈ F }, so μ is trivially quasi-hyperbolic
with β = 0.
Case 2: μ {D ∈ D | D (1) = 0} = 0. Then by (A.2), μ {D ∈ D | D (t) = 0} = 0 for all
t ≥ 1. Since D ≥ 0, μ {D ∈ D | D (t) > 0} = 1 for all t ≥ 1. So D(t) > 0 μ a.s. for all
t ∈ T . Hence, D(t+ 1)/D(t) is well deﬁned μ a.s. for all t ∈ T .
Choose r ∈ ΔX such that u(r) = 1. Deﬁne h ∈ H such that h (2) = r, and h (s) = w
for all s = 2. Also, for any a ∈ (0, 1], deﬁne fa, ga ∈ H such that ga = ah−1 + (1− a)w
and fa = ag−1a + (1− a)w. Hence, we can write down the utility streams for fa, ga, h as
follows:
u ◦ h = (0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ) , u ◦ ga = (0, a, 0, 0, . . . ) , u ◦ fa =
(
a2, 0, 0, 0, . . .
)
.
Moreover, for any t ∈ T , the utility streams for the t-delayed streams f ta, gta, ht are as
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follows:
u ◦ ht = (0, . . . 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ) , u ◦ gta = (0, . . . 0, a, 0, 0, . . . ) , u ◦ f ta =
(
0, . . . a2, 0, 0, 0, . . .
)
,
where h(2) = r. Note that for D ∈ D
D · (u ◦ ht) = D (t+ 2) , D · (u ◦ gta) = D (t+ 1) a, D · (u ◦ f ta) = D (t) a2.
Let F ta :=
{
f ta, g
t
a, h
t
}
. We now consider two cases.
Subcase 2.1: Suppose there exists some a > 0 such that g1a is tied with either f1a or h1.
Consider the case in which g1a is tied with h1. Hence, ρ
(
g1a, h
1
)
= 1 = ρ
(
h1, g1a
)
. By Weak
Stochastic Stationarity, for all t ∈ T , ρ (gta, ht) = ρ (g1a, h1) = 1 = ρ (h1, g1a) = ρ (ht, gta).
Hence, for all t ∈ T , 1 = μ {D ∈ D | D (t+ 1) a = D (t+ 2)}. Thus, if we let β = D(1)a
and δ = a ≤ 1, then for all t > 0, we have μ-a.s.
D (t) =
D (1)
a
at = βδt
The case for g1a is tied with f1a is symmetric. Finally, we show that β ≤ 1 μ-a.s. By
Proposition 1 again,
βδ = D (1) = X0 ≤ Y0 = D (2)
D (1)
= δ
so β ≤ 1 μ-a.s. Hence μ is quasi-hyperbolic as desired.
Subcase 2.2: Now consider the second case where g1a is not tied with f1a nor h1 for all
a > 0. Note that by Weak Stochastic Stationarity, this implies that for all t ≥ 1, gta is not
tied with f ta nor ht.
Note that
{
f t+1a , g
t+1
a
}
= a
{
gta, h
t
}
+ (1− a)w. Hence, by Weak Stochastic Station-
arity and Linearity ρ
(
f ta, g
t
a
)
= ρ
(
f t+1a , g
t+1
a
)
= ρ
(
gta, h
t
)
for any t ≥ 1. This implies that
for every t ≥ 1,
μ
{
D ∈ D ∣∣ D (t) a2 ≥ D (t+ 1) a} = μ {D ∈ D | D (t+ 1) a ≥ D (t+ 2)}
So μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≤ a} = μ {D ∈ D | Yt ≤ a}, where Xt := D(t+1)D(t) ≥ 0 and Yt :=
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D(t+2)
D(t+1) ≥ 0. By the inclusion-exclusion principle28, we have
μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≤ a ≤ Yt }
= μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≤ a}+ μ {D ∈ D | a ≤ Yt } − μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≤ a or a ≤ Yt }
= μ {D ∈ D | Yt ≤ a}+ μ {D ∈ D | a ≤ Yt } − μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≤ a or a ≤ Yt }
= 1− μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≤ a or a ≤ Yt }
= μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≥ a ≥ Yt }
where the third and fourth equalities hold because gta is not tied with f ta nor ht. Since ρ
satisﬁes Decreasing Impatience, by Proposition 1, Xt ≤ Yt μ-a.s. for all t ∈ T . Since this
holds for any a > 0, it must be that for all t ≥ 1,
D (t+ 1)
D (t)
= Xt = Yt =
D (t+ 2)
D (t+ 1)
μ-a.s. If we let δ = D(2)D(1) ≤ 1 and β = D(1)
2
D(2) , then for all t > 0,
D (t) = D (1)
(
D (2)
D (1)
)t−1
= βδt
μ-a.s. We can prove β ≤ 1 μ-a.s. as in the previous case.
A.4.4 Suﬃciency of Theorem 3
Now, suppose ρ satisﬁes Stochastic Stationary and Decreasing Impatience. From Lemma
4, we know that D (t) > 0 μ-a.s. for all t ∈ T . As in the suﬃciency proof for Theorem 4,
deﬁne the streams h, ga, fa and ht, gta, f ta such that for D ∈ D,
D · (u ◦ ht) = D (t+ 2) , D · (u ◦ gta) = D (t+ 1) a, D · (u ◦ f ta) = D (t) a2.
Again we consider two cases.
Case 1: Suppose there exists some a > 0 such that ga is tied with either fa or h. Consider
28 For any two events A and B, P (A ∩B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∪B).
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the case in which ga is tied with h. Hence, ρ (ga, h) = 1 = ρ (h, ga). By Stochastic
Stationarity, for all t ≥ −1, ρ (gta, ht) = 1 = ρ (ht, gta). Hence, for all t ∈ T
1 = μ {D ∈ D | D (t) a = D (t+ 1)} = μ
{
D ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ D (t+ 1)D (t) = a
}
.
If we let δ = a, then for all t ∈ T , we have μ-a.s.
D (t) = D (0) at = δt
so μ is exponential as desired. As before, the case for ga is tied with fa is symmetric.
Case 2: Now consider the second case where ga is not tied with fa nor h for all a > 0.
By Stochastic Stationarity, this implies that for all t ∈ T , gta is not tied with f ta nor
ht. Let Xt :=
D(t+1)
D(t) and Yt :=
D(t+2)
D(t+1) as before. Now, by the same argument as in
the suﬃciency proof for Theorem 4, Stochastic Stationarity and Linearity, imply that
μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≤ a ≤ Yt } = μ {D ∈ D | Xt ≥ a ≥ Yt }. By the same argument as before,
Proposition 1 implies that for all t ∈ T , Xt ≤ Yt μ-a.s.. Since this holds for any a > 0, it
must be that for all t ∈ T ,
D (t+ 1)
D (t)
= Xt = Yt =
D (t+ 2)
D (t+ 1)
μ-a.s.. If we let δ = D (1), then for all t ∈ T , D (t) = D (1)t = δt μ-a.s.. Since D is
decreasing, δ ≤ 1 μ-a.s.. Thus, μ is exponential as desired.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Obviously, μ is not exponential. To show μ satisﬁes Stochastic Stationarity, choose any
d ∈ T . Consider the case in which d is even and d = 2n. Then (Dω(d), Dω(d+ 1), . . . ) =
exp(−2n)Dω.29 Therefore, for any f, g ∈ H,
(Dω(d), Dω(d+1), . . . )·u◦f > (Dω(d), Dω(d+1), . . . )·u◦g ⇔ Dω ·u◦f > Dω ·u◦g. (A.3)
29(Dω(d), Dω(d + 1), . . . ) = (exp(−2n), exp(−2n − 12 − ω), exp(−2(n + 1)), exp(−2(n + 1) − 12 − ω), . . . ) =
exp(−2n)(1, exp(− 12 − ω), exp(−2), exp(− 52 − ω), . . . ) = exp(−2n)Dω.
44
So for any F ⊂ H and f ∈ F ,
ρF d(f
d)
= μ{Dω|(Dω(d), Dω(d+ 1), . . . ) · u ◦ f > (Dω(d), Dω(d+ 1), . . . ) · u ◦ g for all g ∈ F}
= μ{Dω|Dω · u ◦ f ≥ Dω · u ◦ g for all g ∈ F} (∵ (A.3))
= ρF (f).
Consider the case in which d is odd and d = 2n + 1. Then (Dω(d), Dω(d + 1), . . . ) =
exp(−2n)D1−ω.30 Therefore, for any f, g ∈ H,
(Dω(d), Dω(d+1), . . . ) ·u◦f > (Dω(d), Dω(d+1), . . . ) ·u◦g ⇔ D1−ω ·u◦f > D1−ω ·u◦g.
(A.4)
Let I be a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Then for any F ⊂ H and f ∈ F ,
ρF d(f
d)
= μ{Dω|(Dω(d), Dω(d+ 1), . . . ) · u ◦ f > (Dω(d), Dω(d+ 1), . . . ) · u ◦ g for all g ∈ F}
= I({ω|(Dω(d), Dω(d+ 1), . . . ) · u ◦ f > (Dω(d), Dω(d+ 1), . . . ) · u ◦ g for all g ∈ F})
= I({ω|D1−ω · u ◦ f > D1−ω · u ◦ g for all g ∈ F}) (∵ (A.4))
= I({1− ω|D1−ω · u ◦ f > D1−ω · u ◦ g for all g ∈ F}) (∵ I is uniform)
= μ{Dω|Dω · u ◦ f > Dω · u ◦ g for all g ∈ F}
= ρF (f).
Finally, we show that μ violates Decreasing Impatience. Fix r ∈ ΔX such that u (r) =
1 > 0 = u (w). Deﬁne h ∈ H such that h (2) = r, and h (t) = w for all t ∈ T such that
t = 2. Fix a ∈ (0, 1). Deﬁne f, g ∈ H by f = ag−1 + (1− a)w and g = ah−1 + (1− a)w.
Then for all s ∈ T
Dω · u ◦ g > Dω · u ◦ h ⇔ Dω1 a > Dω2 ⇔ a > exp(−32 + ω),
Dω · u ◦ g > Dω · u ◦ f ⇔ Dω1 a > a2 ⇔ exp(−12 − ω) > a.
Note that exp(−12−ω) > exp(−32+ω) if and only if 12 > ω. Let a = exp(−1). Then for
30(Dω(d), Dω(d+1), . . . ) = (exp(−2n− 12 −ω), exp(−2(n+1)), exp(−2(n+1)− 12 −ω), exp(−2(n+2)), . . . ) =
exp(−2n− 12 − ω)(1, exp(− 12 − (1− ω)), exp(−2), exp(− 52 − (1− ω)), . . . ) = exp(−2n)D1−ω.
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all ω < 12 , we have exp(−12 − ω) > exp(−1) > exp(−32 + ω). Hence, ρ{f,g,h}(g) = I
(
ω <
1
2
)
= 12 . This contradicts Decreasing Impatience.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 5
First, we prove the following simple lemma.
Lemma 5. Let u, v ∈ U be non-constant and suppose u (p) > u (q) implies v (p) ≥ v (q)
for all p, q ∈ ΔX. Then v is an aﬃne transformation of u.
Proof. Suppose there exist p, q ∈ ΔX such that u (p) > u (q) and v (p) = v (q). By
the linearity of u and v, there exists ε ∈ (0, 1) such that u ((1− ε)p+ εw) > u (q) and
v ((1− ε)p+ εw) < v (q), which gives a contradiction. Therefore, we have u (p) > u (q)
implies v (p) > v (q) for all p, q ∈ ΔX. The converse can be proved in the same way, so we
have u (p) > u (q) if and only if v (p) > v (q) for all p, q ∈ ΔX. Therefore, v is an aﬃne
transformation of u.
We now prove Theorem 5. For any ﬁnite J ⊂ T such that 0 ∈ J , deﬁne HJ ⊂ H
and KJ ⊂ K as in the proof of Theorem 2. From Lu (2016), Monotonicity, Linearity,
Extremeness and Continuity imply that we can ﬁnd a measure νJ on ΔJ × UJ such that
for all F ∈ KJ ,
ρJF (f) = ν
J
{
(r, u) ∈ ΔJ × UJ
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t∈J
r (t) [ut (f (t))− ut (g (t))] ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F
}
Moreover, νJ satisﬁes regularity.
For every t ∈ T and p ∈ ΔX, let pt ∈ H denote the stream such that pt (t) = p and
pt (s) = w for all s = t. Let J∗ ⊂ J denote the set of time periods such that there exists
p, q ∈ ΔX where pt and qt that are not tied. If t ∈ J∗, then r (t) [ut (p)− ut (q)] = 0
νJ -a.s. which implies that r (t) > 0 νJ -a.s.. Moreover, this also implies that ut is non-
constant νJ -a.s.. Note that by Initial Nondegeneracy, 0 ∈ J∗. By Worst, we also know
that u0 ∈ U∗.
Now, consider J = {0, . . . , n} for some n ∈ T . Order J∗ = {0, t1, . . . , tm} and ﬁrst
consider t1. We will show that for any p, q ∈ ΔX, u0 (p) > u0 (q) implies ut1 (p) ≥ ut1 (q)
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νJ -a.s.. Suppose otherwise, so
0 < νJ
{
(r, u) ∈ ΔJ × UJ |u0 (p) > u0 (q) and ut1 (p) < ut1 (q)
}
. (A.5)
Consider streams f = pt1w, g = qt1w and
h (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p if t < t1
q if t = t1
w if t > t1
Note that f, g, h ∈ HJ and let F = {f, g, h} ∈ KJ . Moreover, note that if h is tied with
g, then u0 (p) = u0 (q) νJ -a.s. contradicting the strict inequality in (A.5). The case for if
h is tied with f is symmetric so h is tied with neither f nor g. By Time Invariance,
0 = ρF (h) = ν
J
{
(r, u) ∈ ΔJ × UJ |u0 (p) ≥ u0 (q) and ut1 (p) ≤ ut1 (q)
}
contradicting inequality (A.5). This means that u0 (p) > u0 (q) implies ut1 (p) ≥ ut1 (q)
νJ -a.s.
By the continuity of vNM utilities, we have u0 (p) > u0 (q) implies ut1 (p) ≥ ut1 (q)
for all p, q ∈ ΔX, νJ -a.s.. Lemma 5 implies that ut1 is an aﬃne transformation of u0
νJ -a.s.. We can repeat the above argument for all t ∈ J∗ to show that ut+1 is an aﬃne
transformation of ut νJ -a.s.. Therefore, every ut is an aﬃne transformation of u0 νJ -a.s.
for all t ∈ J∗.
Now, consider some s ∈ J\J∗ and suppose there exists some t ∈ J∗ where s < t. Let
p ∈ ΔX such that u0 (p) > u0 (w) νJ -a.s.. Such p exists by Initial Nondegeneracy. By
Impatience, we have
1 = ρ (ps, pt) = ν
J
{
(r, u) ∈ ΔJ × UJ | r (t) [ut (w)− ut (p)] ≥ 0
}
.
Since t ∈ J∗, ut is an aﬃne transformation of u0 so ut (p) > ut (w) νJ -a.s.. This implies
that r (t) = 0 νJ -a.s. contradicting the fact that t ∈ J∗. Thus, if s ∈ J\J∗, then for all
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t ∈ J if t > s, then t ∈ J\J∗.
As in the proof of Theorem 2, by Impatience, we can show that r is decreasing on J∗.
Once t ∈ J \ J∗ appears, all s > t belongs to J \ J∗. So we can thus set r (s) = 0 for all
s ∈ J\J∗. Moreover, r will still be decreasing over time.
To summarize, we can deﬁne a measure πJ on ΔJ × U∗ such that for all F ∈ KJ ,
ρJF (f) = π
J
{
(r, u) ∈ ΔJ × U∗
∣∣∣∣∣∑
t∈J
r (t) [u (f (t))− u (g (t))] ≥ 0 for all g ∈ F
}
where r is decreasing in t πJ -a.s.. The rest of the proof follows exactly as in the proof of
Theorem 2 where we use Kolmogorov’s Theorem to extend this to all menus in K.
Finally, we prove the necessity of Time Invariance. Consider f ∈ F such that f (s) ∈
{p, q} for all s ≤ t. Note that if u (p) ≥ u (q), then ∑s≤tD (t) [u (p)− u (f (t))] ≥ 0. On
the other hand, if u (q) ≥ u (p), then ∑s≤tD (t) [u (q)− u (f (t))] ≥ 0. This implies that
ρFtw ({ptw, qtw}) = 1 as desired. The necessity of Worst and Initial Nondegeneracy are
trivial.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Note that if π = η, then ρ (f, g) = τ (f, g) for all f, g ∈ H immediately from the repre-
sentation. Thus, suppose ρ and τ agree on all binary choices. First, note that for any
p, q ∈ ΔX,
ρ (p1g, q1g) = π {(D,u) ∈ D × U∗ | u (p) ≥ u (q)}
= τ (p1g, q1g) = η {(D,u) ∈ D × U∗ | u (p) ≥ u (q)}
Thus, we can assume that utilities under both π and η have the same worst consumption
w. Moreover, we can ﬁnd some b ∈ X such that u (b) > u (w) both π and η -a.s.. Without
loss of generality, normalize the utilities so that u (w) = 0 and u (b) = 1.
Let J be a ﬁnite subset of T . Let n = |X| be the number of prizes and let Hn ⊂ H
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denote the set of streams f such that f (t, x) ≤ 1n for all t ∈ T and x = w. Note that
∑
t
D (t)u (f (t)) =
∑
t
D (t)
∑
x
[f (t)] (x)u (x) =
∑
t,x =w
D (t)u (x) f (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]
=
∑
t,x =w
wD,u (t, x) f (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]
where wD,u (t, x) := D (t)u (x). Then wD,u ∈
[
0, 1n
]J×(n−1) and we can think of f as
corresponding to the vector f ∈ [0, 1n]J×(n−1). We thus have for all f ∈ Hn,
ρ (a (b1w) + (1− a)w, f) = π {(D,u) ∈ D × U∗ | wD,u · f ≤ a}
= τ (a (b1w) + (1− a)w, f) = η {(D,u) ∈ D × U∗ | wD,u · f ≤ a}
Since this is true for all f ∈ [0, 1n]J×(n−1), by using Cramer-Wold as in the proof for
Theorem 1, we have the distribution of wD,u is the same under π as under η. Finally, note
that wD,u = wD′,u′ implies (D,u) = (D′, u′) so π = η as desired
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
For each t ∈ T and F ∈ K, recall that we deﬁned F t = {f t|f ∈ F}. For each F ∈ Kt, we
can deﬁne F−t = {f−t|f ∈ F}, where f−t is an element of H such that (f−t)t = f .
Let ρ (F ) := ρt
(
F t
)
for all F ∈ K. Since ρt satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 2, there
exists a
(
μt, ut
)
that represents it. Thus, for s ≥ t,
ρF (f) = ρ
t
F t
(
f t
)
= ρtF s (f
s)
= μt
{
D ∈ D
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t′
D
(
t′
)
ut
(
f s
(
t′
)) ≥∑
t′
D
(
t′
)
ut
(
gs
(
t′
)) ∀g ∈ F
}
= μts
{
D ∈ D
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t′
D
(
t′
)
ut
(
f
(
t′
)) ≥∑
t′
D
(
t′
)
ut
(
g
(
t′
)) ∀g ∈ F
}
where μts is the marginal distribution of μt for (D (t′))t′≥s. Note that the ﬁrst and last
equations follow from the deﬁnitions, the second from Stochastic Stationarity and the third
from the representation. It then follows that ρ is represented by
(
μts, u
t
)
.
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By Stochastic Dynamic Consistency, we have ρt (F ) = ρs (F ) for t < s and F ∈ Ks.
Thus, ρF (f) = ρsF s (f
s) so ρ is also represented by (μss, us). Theorem 1 then implies that
μts = μ
s
s and ut = αus + β for α > 0. Since ρt also satisfy the axioms of Theorem 3,
μt is just a single-dimensional distribution. Thus, μts = μss for all s ≥ t implies that the
distribution of δ is the same for all ρt. Deﬁning μ = μ0 and u = u0 yield the desired
conclusion.
Next we assume the representation and show that {ρt}t∈T satisﬁes the axioms. In
Section 6.2, we have shown that {ρt}t∈T satisﬁes Stochastic Dynamic Consistency. For
each t ∈ T , ρt satisﬁes the axioms in Theorems 2 and 3 (deﬁned with Kt instead of K) as
in the proof of Theorem 2 and 3.
B Appendix: Decreasing Impatience and Extreme-
ness
In this section, we demonstrate a technical relationship between Decreasing Impatience
and Extremeness. We show that Decreasing Impatience in the random exponential model
plays an analogous role as Extremeness in the random expected utility model of Gul and
Pesendorfer (2006).
Let X be a ﬁnite set and ΔX be the set of lotteries over X. Let C and C ′ be ﬁnite sets
of lotteries. We say C is a translate of C ′ if and only if C = C ′ + (p− q) for some p ∈ C
and q ∈ C ′.31 First, note that in the lottery setup, Stochastic Stationarity is equivalent
to Linearity∗, a weaker condition than Linearity.
Axiom (Linearity∗). ρC (f) = ρC′ (f ′) if C and f are translates of C ′ and f ′ respectively.
Clearly, Linearity implies Linearity∗. There are random non-expected utility represen-
tations that yield random choice rules that satisfy Linearity∗ but not Extremeness. We
now describe one such example. Let X = {x, y} so we can associate each lottery with a
31More explicitly, there exists p ∈ C and q ∈ C ′ such that C = {r + p− q | r ∈ C ′ }.
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point p ∈ [0, 1]. Let ω be uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and let
uω (p) := |p− ω| ,
vω (p) := − |p− ω| .
Consider a random utility that puts 12 weight on uω and
1
2 weight on vω. To show that
this violates Extremeness, let C =
{
0, 12 , 1
}
. Since the mixed lottery 12 is never chosen in
C under uω, we have that
ρC
(
1
2
)
=
1
2
· P
{
ω ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣ vω
(
1
2
)
≥ max {vω (0) , vω (1)}
}
=
1
4
> 0.
To show that this satisﬁes Linearity∗, suppose C = {p1, . . . , pk} with p1 < p2 < · · · < pk.
Now, for each pi such that 1 < i < k, we have
ρC (pi) =
1
2
(
pi+1 − pi−1
2
)
which is unchanged if we translate C. For p1, we have
ρC (p1) =
1
2
(
p1 + p2
2
)
+
1
2
(
1− p1 + pk
2
)
=
1
2
(
1− pk − p2
2
)
which is again unchanged if we translate C. By symmetric argument, the same holds for pk
as well, so Linearity∗ is satisﬁed, but this is clearly not a random expected utility model.
By imposing Extremeness however, we are able to obtain a random expected utility
representation. In other words, similar to Decreasing Impatience, Extremeness provides
the additional restrictions to ensure the existence of a random utility representation with
linear utilities.32
Proposition 5. Suppose ρ has a random utility representation. Then ρ satisﬁes Linearity
if and only if it satisﬁes Linearity∗ and Extremeness
Proof. Since Linearity implies Linearity∗, all we need to show is that Linearity∗ and Ex-
32While Proposition 5 shows how Extremeness ensures the existent of a random linear utility representation,
it does not guarantee that the utilities in any random utility representation must be linear. In this sense, our
Theorem 3 is stronger.
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tremeness imply Linearity. Let C ′ = aC + (1− a) r for some r ∈ ΔX and a ∈ (0, 1). By
Extremeness, we can only consider the extreme set of points of C without loss of general-
ity. Suppose C has k extreme points. Hence, we can translate C ′ k-times such that each
translated C ′i overlaps with an extreme point pi ∈ C and conv (C ′i) ⊂ conv (C). Now,
deﬁne
E :=
⋃
i
C ′i
Note that ext (E) = C. By Extremeness, we know that ρE (C) = 1. By Monotonicity, we
have
ρE (pi) ≤ ρC (pi)
for all pi ∈ C. Since pi are also the extreme points of E, by Extremeness, we also have
that
∑
i ρE (pi) = 1. Hence, it must be that ρE (pi) = ρC (pi) for all i. Moreover, by
Monotonicity again, we have that for each i,
ρC′i (pi) ≥ ρE (pi)
as C ′i ⊂ E for all i. If we let p′i = api + (1− a) r ∈ C ′, then by Linearity∗, we have
ρC′
(
p′i
)
= ρC′i (pi) ≥ ρE (pi) = ρC (pi)
for all pi ∈ C. Since this is true for all i, and by Extremeness again
∑
i ρC′ (p
′
i) = 1, it
must be that ρC′ (p′i) = ρC (pi) for all i. Hence, Linearity is satisﬁed as desired.
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